In thinking about the relationships between nonfinancial economic activity and quantity measures of what is happening in the financial markets, most economists and most economic policy makers today focus primarily -if not exclusively -on money. At the theoretical level, the implicit assumption underlying most current macroeconomic analysis is that the money stock is both necessary and sufficient to represent the relevant information contained in financial quantities. Almost every macroeconomic model, no matter how simplified, includes the money stock among the variables it represents explicitly, and few such models include any financial quantities other than money. At the applied policy level, the formulation of monetary policy in most of the industrialized Western countries takes place in terms of target rates of monetary growth. The most prominent exception to the pervasive emphasis on money in macroeconomic analysis is that the large macroeconometric models often do include non-money financial quantities, but even here such variables are usually only peripheral)
This single-minded devotion to the money stock raises issues that go beyond mere questions of definition. Any specific monetary aggregate is, after all, a collection of certain of the public's financial assets.
Although it would strain the meaning of the word "money" to include in it such items as equity claims and long-term debt instruments, as long as the focus of analysis is exclusively on the public's assets the question of which ones to include is, in the end, a matter of definition.2 The more fundamental issue stems from the underlying reality that any balance sheet has two sides. -2- Except in the trivial sense that the entirety of the public's assets equals the entirety of its liabilities plus net worth, the distinction between assets and liabilities -between money and credit -is not definitional. Merely redefining ways of adding up the various items on the asset side of the public's balance sheet is not sufficient if there is also valuable information contained in the liability side.
What accounts for the current preoccupation with money to the exclusiori of other financial quantities? Is there something about money that is "special" in an a priori sense, or is the reason instead an empirical presumption that, for reasons unexplained, variations in money somehow correspond more closely to the variations in the nonfinancial aggregates which are the primary object of macroeconomic inquiry?
Apart from government-issued base money, which is usually not the definition that people have in mind either in economic analysis or in discussions of monetary policy,3 there is nothing "special" about money in an a priori sense. In the simplest abstraction of an economy with no privately issued financial instruments, base money is the only financial asset, and there are no liabilities. In modern economies, however, most money is not base money but bank money, and privately issued financial instruments constitute the great majority of all such instruments issued, held and traded.
For given growth in base money (if that is what the relevant authority does in fact control), the behavior of the banking system and that of the nonbank public together determine the growth of both bank money and bank credit, and do so jointly with the determination of nonbank financial assets and liabilities as well as nonfinancial economic activity. Economic theory provides no a priori reason at all to expect a role for the nonbank public's money holdings but not its credit liabilities.
The reason for emphasizing money in macroeconomic analysis must instead be a set of presumptions about the empirical relationships connecting money and the behavior of key measures of nonfinancial economic activity, including especially income and prices. Indeed, during the last two decades a vast literature has developed documenting money-income arid money-price relationships, in a variety of forms corresponding to variations in the underlying theoretical framework, and for a large number of different countries and different time periods. Now more recent work has shown that, at least for the United States during the period since the 1951 Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord, the relationship between economic activity and the public's outstanding credit liabilities exhibits the same degree of regularity and stability as does the relationship between economic activity and the public's holdings of money balances. Moreover, still incomplete analysis suggests that the approximately equal regularity of the credit-income and money-income relationships holds for other countries as well, including Canada, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom.4
The object of this paper is to present the empirical case for a redirection of emphasis in macroeconomic research, as well as in the formulation of monetary policy, away from the sole focus on money among financial quantities. The goal is not to show that the money stock contains no information that is useful in these two contexts, nor even to suggest that some non-money quantity dominates the money stock in these contexts and therefore should replace it as the fulcrum of analysis. The point is simply that the available empirical evidence does not warrant an exclusive focus on any one financial quantity. Moreover, if for some reason there is a need to focus on just one financial quantity, the evidence provides no reason to conclude that that one should be a monetary aggregate rather than a -4-credit aggregate.
Section I reviews the evidence documenting the approximately equal regularity and stability of the relationships between money and income and between credit and income in the United States. Merely finding empirical regularities settles few interesting questions, however. Indeed, it is difficult to think of a familiar economic hypothesis that is contradicted merely by the finding of a close relationship between credit and income.
It could always be the case, of course, that the operative chain of causation ran from money to income and thence from income to credit, so that the public's decisions with respect to credit liabilities remained a peripheral aspect of economic behavior, one which macroeconomic analysis could safely ignore in the interest of simplification.
Section II examines evidence bearing on the interaction among money, credit and economic activity, drawn from statistical investigations that are prior to structural economic model building.5 Here too the results provide no justification for a special emphasis on money to the exclusion of credit in macroeconomic analysis. At the same time, the results do go beyond merely indicating parallel roles for money and credit. Especially in the context of the determination of real income, what apparently matters is neither money nor credit alone but rather the interrelationship between them.
Section III goes on to consider what kind of structural economic model would be consistent with this set of empirical observations. This line of investigation inevitably leads to the issue of the role of financial prices (in other words, interest rates), in addition to financial quantities, in determining nonfinancial economic behavior. Here the evidence indicates a significant, but still less than complete, connection between the relationship of income to credit documented in Sections I-li and the familiar relationship of income to interest rates documented in a precise way in other recent work. Because the interest rate is the price of credit in terms of money, this analysis leads naturally to the idea of a three-market model -including the markets for goods and services, for money and for credit -as an appropriate framework for structural analysis.
Section IV brings together the major conclusions reached in the paper and then explores their implications for monetary policy. Moreover, in contrast to the familiar asset aggregates, among which there appears to be little basis for choice from this perspective, total nonfinancial debt appears to be unique in this regard among major liability aggre- For example, the data include such items as a household's mortgage issued to a bank, or a corporation's bonds sold to an insurance company, but they exclude any liability issued in turn by the bank or the insurance company in order to finance that lending activity. The data also exclude debt issued by separate financial subsidiaries of nonfinancial corporations, as well as by federally sponsored credit agencies and mortgage pools. The data are "gross," however, in the sense that they include all of an individual househo]d or firm's outstanding credit market liabilities, not just any excess of liabilities over either financial or total assets, and also in the sense that they include one household's borrowing from another or one firm's borrowing from another.
The strong stability of the total nonfinancial debt ratio, shown in -.
-. -.
-. - groupings, including the "total nonfinancial debt" measure plotted in Figure 1 , and five asset groupings by showing the coefficient of variation (standard deviation normalized by mean) for each ratio computed from both annual nd quarterly U.S. data over the 1953-78 sample period (except for the M3 money stock, for which data begin only in 1959). In each case the table shows the coefficient of variation computed from raw data, and also computed from detrended data.
As columns (1) and (3) of Table 1 show, the comparison for data including time trends indicates that total net assets and total nonfinancia1 debt are (in that order) the most stable, while the Ml money stock and the monetary base (in that order) are the least stable, among the ten aggiegates, Whether or not a particular relationship exhibits a time trend, however, has little to do with its "stability" in the usual economic sense. The corresponding comparison for detrended data, shown in columns (2) and (4, again indicates that total net assets is the most stable aggregate in relation to gross national product, with toal debt and total nonfinancial debt, respectively, a close second and third. The monetary base exhibits the least stability on a detrended basis, with private nonfinancial liabilities and the Ml money stock close behind. Orderings based on annual data are essentially the same as those based on quarterly data.
Simple ratios of precisely contemporaneous observations may well fail to capture the relevant concept of "stability" in the relationship among variables that move over time with some general lead or lag pattern between them. The remaining columns of Table 1 Columns (5) and (6) of Table 1 show the results of estimating equations of the form (1) (7) and (8) also show the respective results for analogous regression equations based on data for 1970-78 only.9 For this shorter period the relative performance of total nonfinancial debt is somewhat better, equalling that of the Ml money stock.
In part because of the extent to which regressions of the form (1) have been discredited by a variety of criticisms, researchers examining the money-income (or, here, credit-income) relationship have increasingly (3) that extracts the independent part of p2 (say, 62) as "the F innovation" is then just -l 1l l2 Elt Ft -+ 2l 22 E2t (4) where the .. and the E. follow from the e.. and the p., respectively, and the s. are now independent.
The upper half of Table 2 summarizes simulations of (4), estimated in the form (1) using quarterly data for nominal gross national product and three each of the liability and asset aggregates from in response to a 1% innovation in F.
What stands out in these results is the contrast between the time paths for the three asset aggregate ratios, each of which declines rapidly albeit irregularly after such an innovation, and those for the three liability aggregate ratios. The total nonfinancial debt ratio declines rapidly too, indicating about the same stability in this respect as does any of the asset aggregates; but both the (narrower) private nonfinancial debt ratio and the (broader) total debt ratio show pronounced instability, with overshooting lasting up to three years beyond the initial innovation in F.12
A further aspect of the tendency in recent research to avoid simple nominal income regressions of the form (1) has been a reluctance to ignore the distinction between the real and price components of nominal income variation. The lower half of where X is real gross national product and P is the price deflator (both in natural logarithms). Once again the results show a fairly rapid return of the F/(X•P) ratio after an innovation in any of the three asset aggregates and also in total nonfinancial debt, but a slower and less stable return after an innovation in either private nonfinancial debt or total debt.
among the various liability measures considered, therefore, these results suggest that there is indeed something unique about total nonfinancial debt. It is as if the Ml money stock ratio were sharply unstable, but adding commercial bank time and saving deposits to form the M2 money stock ratio: yielded stability, and further adding thrift institution deposits to'form the M3 money stock ratio destroyed that stability -none of which appears to happen. Hence not only does the total nonfinancial debt ratio exhibit just as much stability as any of the five asset ratios in these dynamic tests, it does so uniquely among the various liability aggregates tested.
In sum, the evidence provided by a variety of methodologies shows that at least one aggregate measure of outstanding credit liabilities in the United States -total nonfinancial debt -consistently exhibits just as much stability in relation to U.S. economic activity as do the more familiar asset aggregates. Indeed, the debt-to-income relationship measured in this way can appear to be more stable than any particular money-to-income relationship, depending on the specific measure of money and the specific test used.
- 13- Regardless of whether the credit-income relationship is "as stable as"
or "more stable than" that for money, however, like the money-income relationship it is potentially important for understanding economic behavior.
Nevertheless, although the money-income relationship has long been the focus of attention, the credit-iicome relationship has to date stimulated little investigation. actions to be jointly determined or, alternatively, for one to be predte,-mined with respect to another. "Causality" is a concept with a precise meaning in logic (indeed, several precise meanings), but there is little prospect of using time-series evidence to settle directly questions of economic causality)3 "Exogeneity" is a concept with a precise meaning in econometrics, and time-series evidence is better suited to bear on questions of econometric exogeneity. In recent years the literature of this subject has therefore moved away from asserting that one variable "causes" another to the alternative formulation that the one "is exogenous with respect to" the other. Even so, as the development of this literature during the past decade has amply shown, whether one variable is or is not predetermined with respect to another, even in the narrower sense of econometric exogeneity,
depends on (among other considerations) what if any third or further variables the analysis incorporates)4
Perhaps the best way of formulating the question at hand so as to convey the actual meaning of the tests developed for such purposes by
Granger [9] and Sims [18] is to ask whether one variable "incrementally predicts" or "incrementally explains" another. Because the basis of such tests consists of regression equations relating one variable to lagged values of another, the issue is really whether the lagged variation of the right-hand-side variable predicts (in beyond-sample analysis) or explains (in within-sample analysis) the variation of the left-hand-side variable.
The relevant prediction or explanation is not absolute but incremental, Put in these terms, one rationale for focusing on the money market but not the credit market in macroconomic analysis would be a presumption that money incrementally explains real economic behavior in a way that credit does not Table 3 summarizes evidence testing this proposition, drawn from two of the trivariate vector autoregression systems estimated as in (5) above. The upper half of the The results presented in Table 3 Hence the evidence does not support the proposition that money holdings and nonfinancial behavior are jointly determined in some sense in which credit borrowings and nonfinancial behavior are not, nor does it support the proposition that money is prior to nonfinancial behavior while credit is not. Indeed, the results reject at the 1% level the proposition that money is predetermined with respect to either income or prices. By contrast, a test of the proposition that money is predetermined with respect to nominal income (that is, that nominal income does not incrementally explain money), as in Sims [18] , would impose on the analysis the constraint that the respective coefficients of lagged real income and lagged prices must be identical in the equation explaining money -a constraint that the dat4 decisively reject.15
Although the finding that real income and prices incrementally explain both money and credit is not surprising (at least not to this writer), the apparent absence of any effect of either money or credit on real income is somewhat surprising. Because prices apparently do incrementally explain real income (albeit weakly in the second system), while both money and credit incrementally explain prices, this result is not evidence for any straightforward classical neutrality proposition. Even so, it would be surprising if prices were a sufficient statistic for whatever information financial quantities conveyed about decisions with respect to real spending, output and income. Table 4 helps to resolve this puzzle by presenting statistics, an4o-gous to those in Table 3 , for the estimation of the four-variable vector autoregression system including both money and credit in addition to real gross national product and the price deflator. Apart from the expansion to include all four variables, the system summarized in Table 4 is identical to those represented by (5) above.
The contrast between the results for the four-variable system and he corresponding results for the two trivariate systems once again illustrates that whether or not one variable incrementally explains another depends crucially on the base from which the increment is measured -and not always The other results presented in Table 4 here is to determine the price level P and interest rate r -in other words, the two rates of exchange spanning the three markets. An equilibrium in (r,P) space is determined by the joint intersection, as at point E1, of the three curves representing the market-clearing (r,P) combinations for the three markets: Xx for the goods and services market, MM for the money market and CC for the credit market. A change in the underlying conditions that shifts any of the three curves must also shift at least one of the others. Two lines are sufficient to determine a point, of course, so that even in this framework it still is formally possible to eliminate one of the three markets. What remains impossible, however, is to determine the effects of a change affecting any one market without, at the very least, making a potentially refutable assumption about a corresponding change in at least one other. In the example of the money market mutual fund, shifting MM to M'M' and leaving XX in place, as is analogous to the practice in the more conventional Hicks-Keynes IS-LM analysis, is equivalent to assuming a specific shift in CC. Similarly, analyzing an increase in government spending that shifts XX to XIX' by leaving MM in place is again equivalent to assuming a specific shift in CC. In either case, behavior in the credit market may or may not warrant such an assumption. The results presented in Tables 3 and 4 In the context of this three-market representation of economic activity, the four-variable system summarized in Table 4 uses the quantity of credit to represent the relevant aspects of behavior in the credit market, while the remaining three variables represent the quantities in the other two markets (goods and services and money) and the rate of exchange between them. To the extent that the objective is simply to include some representatibn of the credit market, however, the quantity of credit is not the only logical choice for this purpose. The alternative is either the rate of exchange between credit and money in a market with nominal bonds, or the rate of exchange between credit and goods in a market with indexed bonds. Following Mehra's [13] demonstration that including the interest rate in the analysis is sufficient to reverse Sims' [18] earlier findings that money incrementally explains income but not vice versa, Sims [19] has estimated the analog to the system in Table 4 using the rate of exchange between credit and money -that is, the nominal interest rate -to represent the role of the credit market. Table 5 summarizes the results of estimating a fourvariable system like Sims', but using the same data and details of estimation as in the work presented above. 19 The results are close to Sims', and they offer some interesting contrasts to those in Table 4 . The interest rate incrementally explains real income, while prices no longer do, nor does money.2° In the absence of the credit quantity, however, money once again incrementally explains prices. Real income again incrementally explains money, but in the presence of the interest rate prices no longer do. Money does not incrementally explain the interest rate here, although it does incrementally explain the credit quantity in Table 4 .
Beyond the simple distinction between using the quantity variable and using the relative price variable to represent the third market, is there any relationship between the two systems summarized in Tables 4 and 5 Both credit demand and credit supply are presumably stochastic in reality, so that the actual correlation will be imperfect. The value of the correlation coefficient constitutes potentially useful information, however.
First, the correlation's sign will indicate whether the dominant source of stochastic variation in the credit market comes from the behavior of borrowers or lenders. Second, and more importantly, the correlation's absolute value
will indicate to what extent a univariate representation of the credit market -either the interest rate or the credit quantity -is adequate. In the extreme case in which either credit demand or credit supply is nonstochastic, so that the correlation is perfect, either variable contains all of the relevant information about stochastic shifts in the credit market. At th other extreme, if credit demand and credit supply are both about equally stochastic (in independent ways), the two variables contain two separate sets of information, both of which are necessary. Table 6 shows the pairwise correlations between the independent innovations associated with the credit quantity in the orthogonalized moving-average representation solved out from the four-variable vector autoregression system summarized in Table 4 and the independent innovations associated with the interest rate in the analogous representation of the system summarized in Table 5 . Table 6 shows correlations between the innovations per Se, as well as between their respective first differences. In addition, because the ordering assumed in the orthogonalization in general affects the computation of the innovations corresponding to particular variables, the table shows correlations for the innovations computed for credit and the interest rate ordered last in their respective systems (as in Table 2 above) and The correlation between the two innovations is positive regardless of the details of the computation, indicating that credit demand -that is, the behavior of borrowers -is the dominant source of stochastic variation in the credit market. None of the correlations approaches unity, however, confirming that credit supply is also importantly subject to stochastic variation. Hence it is highly unlikely that either the credit quantity or the interest rate constitutes, by itself, a sufficient representation of the credit market.
Some representation of the credit market in macroeconomic analysis is clearly better than none, and the chief contribution of the four-variable systems presented in Tables 4 and 5 is that each includes one variable for this purpose: a quantity in the former and a relative price in the latter. Nevertheless, the evidence presented here suggests not only that macroeconomic analysis should explicitly incorporate the credit market but also that it should do so with both a quantity and a relative price variable.
The resulting framework would then be a fully specified three-market model, including real income, money and credit (the quantities in all three markets) as well as the price level and the interest rate (the two rates of exchange spanning them) 20
IV. Implications for Monetary Policy
The evidence presented in this paper supports three conclusions about the respective roles of money and credit in macroeconomic analysis:
First, the relationship between credit and nonfinancial economic activity is just as regular and stable as is that between money and economic activity. The evidence does not warrant including the money market but excluding the credit market on grounds of the closeness, or lack thereof, of the observed empirical relationships.
Second, real income and prices are not predetermined with respect to credit, any more so than they are with respect to money. The evidence does not warrant excluding either the credit market or the money market on grounds of being only peripheral to the determination of nonfinancial economic activity.
Third, the interest rate and the quantity of credit both represent aspects of behavior in the credit market that matter for nonfinancial economic activity. The evidence suggests, however, that neither variable alone is adequate to convey all of the information about the credit market that is relevant to macroeconomic analysis. In the wake of the widely publicized collapse of previously well accepted U.S. money demand functions during the l970s, further evidence that the demand for money does not meet these conditions is hardly necessary.
Even so, the evidence presented in this paper further strengthens the case 9. Apart from the equation for M3, which is based on a shorter sample period because of limited data availability, the F-statistic for a break at 1970 is significant at the 10% level for all of these equations and at the 5% level for all but two (total debt and total net assets). and Ando [14] . The methodology underlying the tests described below is due largely to Granger and Sims; see especially Sims [18] . for A = cov(j ,p2)/var(p1). This orthogonalization is equivalent to placing F las in the pairwise causal ordering of Y and F. The alternative ordering placing F first, which follows from transposing the A (or -A) and the zero elements, gives results that are close to those reported below; see [6 1.
